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1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the recent breakthroughs achieved by Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) for various
computer vision tasks (He et al., 2015; Taigman et al., 2014; Karpathy et al., 2014), CNNs are
highly regarded technology for inclusion into real-life vision applications. However, CNNs have a
high risk of failing due to adversarial examples, which fool them consistently with the addition of
small perturbations to natural images, undetectable by the human eyes.
To mitigate this risk, it has been proposed to train CNNs on both clean training samples and cor-
responding adversarial examples, generated by some existing algorithms (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Szegedy et al., 2013; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Sabour et al., 2015). Although such trained
CNNs are robust to specific types of adversaries, they are not necessarily protected from all possible
types. To increase the robustness of CNNs, it has been proposed to train them on a diverse set of
adversaries, generating adversarial examples for any single images with various algorithms (Rozsa
et al., 2016). However, it is still possible to produce other types of adversaries, uncovered by the
current set, impacting significantly the reliability of CNNs. Moreover, training on some type of
adversaries has been demonstrating to harm the performance on clean test samples (Jin et al., 2015;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016).
We are rather considering recognition of adversarial examples as an open set recognition problem,
where unknown samples should be detected and rejected by the underlying models. Bendale &
Boult (2016) have adapted CNNs by adding an extra layer designed to recognize the unknown sam-
ples, which can be either from unknown classes or fooling adversarial instances from Nguyen et al.
(2015). However, as mentioned by the authors, the method fails to detect hard adversaries where
the target class and the true class of an adversary are close together, like those generated by Fast
Gradient Sign (FGS) (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and DeepFool (DF) (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016).
We are proposing to use an ensemble of diverse specialists, where speciality is defined according to
the confusion matrix. Indeed, we observed that for adversarial instances originating from a given
class, labeling tend to be done into a small subset of (incorrect) classes. Therefore, we argue that
an ensemble of specialists should be better able to identify and reject fooling instances, with a high
entropy (i.e., disagreement) over the decisions in the presence of adversaries. Experimental results
obtained confirm this interpretation that a rejection mechanism can provide a means of rendering the
system more robust to adversarial examples, rather than trying to classify them properly at any cost.
2 SPECIALISTS+1 ENSEMBLE
Ensemble construction The confusion matrices of FGS adversaries (Fig. 1) reveals that samples
from each class have a high tendency of being fooled toward a limited number of classes. From
these confusion matrices of training adversaries we define subsets of classes, similarly to Hinton
et al. (2015) on training clean samples. Considering a classification problem of K classes (C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cK}), each row of the confusion matrix is used to identify two subsets of classes: 1)
the confusing target subset for class ci (subset Ui), which is built by adding classes sequentially in
decreasing ci-related confusion values order until at least 80 % of confusions are covered, and 2) the
remaining classes with lower confusion, formed as subset Ui+K = C \Ui. Duplicate subsets should
be ignored, although we encountered none of them for MNIST and CIFAR-10.
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(a) MNIST Confusion Matrix
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(b) CIFAR-10 Confusion Matrix
Figure 1: Confusion matrices of adversaries for (a) MNIST and (b) CIFAR-10. These matrices have
been computed from 5000 randomly selected FGS training adversaries (500 per class).
Algorithm 1 Voting Mechanism
Input: EnsembleH = {h1, . . . , hM} with hj ∈ RK , label subsets U = {U1, . . . , UM}, input x
Output: Final prediction h¯(x) ∈ RK
1: vk(x)←
∑M
j=1 I[ck = argmaxKi=1 h
j
i (x)], k = 1, . . . ,K
2: k∗ ← argmaxKk=1 vk(x)
3: if vk∗(x) = K + 1
4: S ← {hi ∈ H | ck∗ ∈ Ui}
5: h¯(x)← 1K+1
∑
hi∈S h
i(x)
6: else
7: h¯(x)← 1M
∑
hi∈H h
i(x)
8: return h¯(x)
For each of these class subsets, a specialist CNN is trained on samples from the associated classes,
instances from the other classes being ignored. The ensemble also includes a generalist CNN trained
on the complete labels (subset U2K+1), hence the name “specialists+1 ensemble”.
Voting mechanism Using the generalist to activate the related specialists is not possible as it is
usually being fooled by adversaries. In Algorithm 1, we propose a voting mechanism to compute
the final prediction. As each class ci appears K + 1 times in M subsets of classes, the maximum
expected number of votes to class ci is K + 1. Also, we define vi(x) as the actual number of votes
to class ci for a given input image x (the equation in line 1 of the algorithm 1). If only one class has
its actual number of votes equal to its maximum expected number of votes, i.e., vi(x) = K + 1, it
means that all K related specialists and the generalist agree to vote to the winner class. Then only
those CNNs voting for the winner class should be activated in order to compute the final prediction.
Otherwise, if none of the classes obtain their maximum expected number of votes, it means that at
least one of the individuals was fooled. So, some votes are incorrectly distributed between different
classes. In the presence of such entropy, where there is no winner class, all of the individuals should
be activated to compute the final prediction.
3 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Networks and datasets Similarly to Hinton et al. (2012), we used CNNs with three convolutional
layers having 32, 32, and 64 filters respectively, and a fully-connected layer followed by a softmax.
The networks are trained on usual training and testing sets of MNIST and CIFAR-10, without any
data augmentation. See the Appendix section for full details on the network architecture and hyper-
parameters used for each dataset. Note that all CNNs presented in the experiments have an identical
architecture.
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(c) Specialists+1
Figure 2: Confidence densities on MNIST: (a) naive CNN*, (b) pure ensemble, and (c) specialists+1.
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Figure 3: Confidence densities on CIFAR-10: (a) naive CNN*, (b) pure ensemble, and (c) special-
ists+1.
Experiments We compared our proposed specialists+1 ensemble with a pure ensemble, which
consists of 5 generalist CNNs with different random initializations, and a naive CNN*, whose
weights initialization is different from GA-CNN (i.e., the CNN used to generate the adversaries).
Using this GA-CNN, three types of adversaries, namely FGS, DF, and Szegedy et al. (2013) adver-
saries, are generated for correctly classified clean test samples.
Naive CNN*, pure ensemble, and specialists+1 ensemble are compared according to their distribu-
tions of confidence on correctly classified clean test samples and their corresponding adversaries for
MNIST and CIFAR-10 in Fig. 2 and 3, respectively. According to these observations for MNIST,
specialists+1 successfully provides significantly lower confidence for most of the misclassified ad-
versaries, regardless of their types, than naive CNN* and the pure ensemble. Also, as it can be
seen from Fig. 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) that the distribution of confidence on MNIST correctly classified
clean test samples by these three frameworks are roughly similar. For CIFAR-10, we observed the
same behavior as MNIST for adversaries (Fig. 3). But for correctly classified clean test samples,
specialists+1 shifts some of these samples to lower confidence (the green curve in Fig. 3(c)).
Although the specialists+1 is not trained from any adversaries, it appears able to automatically re-
duce the confidence of predictions for most of the misclassified adversaries, regardless of their types,
while preserving up to some point the confidence on clean samples. However, it reduces the con-
fidence of a few clean test samples. Therefore, developing a learning model that is not confident
about unknown samples but yet is confident about known samples can be a used to identify and
reject adversaries. We depicted the effect of rejecting low confidence adversaries on the error rates
of different types of adversaries in Fig. 5, in Appendix due to space consideration.
Conclusion In brief, without training from adversaries and by leveraging diversity in ensembles
by a specialization over the labels, the specialists+1 ensemble approach is able to better discriminate
between legitimate samples and adversarial instances. The approach is better at rejecting adversaries
while accepting clean samples based on confidence, compared to the pure ensemble and Naive
CNN*. That is an important matter in order to increase robustness of CNNs to carefully crafted
attacks, preferring to refuse processing suspicious instances rather than being fooled by carefully
crafted attacks. As future work, we will compare our approach with CNN explicitly trained to being
robust to specific types of adversaries.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
We consider a CNN with three convolutional layers and one fully connected layer, where each
convolutional layer is interlaced with ReLU, local contrast normalization, and a pooling layer. For
regularization, dropout is used at the last layer, i.e., fully-connected layer, with p = 0.5. All of
the hyper parameters such as initial learning rate, training schedule, and so on are set according
to Hinton et al. (2012).
MNIST This dataset contains grayscale images of size 28x28, where each image holds a handwrit-
ten digit. The training and test sets have 60,000 and 10,000 samples, respectively. All of the images
are scaled to [0, 1]. 150 epochs for training with batch size 128 and the initial learning rate 0.1 with
momentum 0.9 are exploited. The learning rate is decayed by factor 10 twice during training, at
epochs 50 and 100.
CIFAR-10 This dataset consists of 50,000 RGB images of size 32x32 as training set and 10,000
32x32 RGB images as test set. Each image contains one object from one of 10 classes. All images,
either from train or from test sets, are scaled to [0, 1], then normalized by mean subtraction, where
the mean is computed over the training set. Like MNIST, 150 epochs with batch size 128 and the
initial learning rate is 0.01 with momentum of 0.9. The learning rate decays twice by factor 10
shortly before terminating training, at epochs 120 and 130.
A.2 GENERATING ADVERSARIES
Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) (Goodfellow et al., 2014), DeepFool (DF) (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016),
and the algorithm proposed by (Szegedy et al., 2013) are used for adversarial example generation.
The latter algorithm finds minimum required perturbations at a high computational cost, while FGS
and DF generates adversaries significantly faster, i.e., less than 3 iterations.
Using the GA-CNN (the baseline CNN for generating adversaries), correctly classified clean sam-
ples are identified then used for generating adversarial examples. Therefore, 9943 and 8152 ad-
versaries are generated from MNIST and CIFAR-10 test sets, respectively. The optimal values for
hyper parameters of FGS and Szegedy et al. (2013) are obtained for each dataset such that GA-CNN
misclassifies 100% of the correctly classified clean samples after adding perturbations.
In Fig. 4, the average distortions (perturbations) generated by each algorithm for MNIST and
CIFAR-10 are depicted. As well, their average misclassification confidences are written in blue.
Distortion is measured by
√∑D
i=1(xi−x′i)2
D for each pair of clean sample (x ∈ RD) and its corre-
sponding adversary (x′).
Figure 4: Average distortion to MNIST and CIFAR-10 samples by FGS, DF, and Szegedy et al.
(2013). The average misclassification confidences are shown by blue text.
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A.3 EXTRA EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Let h(x) = [h1(x), . . . , hK(x)] be a multi-classification system (e.g., single classifier h(x) or
ensemble h¯(x)) trained on clean training samples. Like Bendale & Boult (2016), we consider a
threshold (τ ) for rejecting instances with low confidence, assigning them to a reject class cK+1. The
following classical decision function is used:
r(x) =
{
argmax
ci∈C
hi(x) if max
ci∈C
hi(x) ≥ τ
cK+1 otherwise
. (1)
Two types of errors should be considered: error ED on the clean set D = {xi, yi}Ni=1, and error EA
on the adversaries set A = {x′i, y′i}N
′
i=1 (y
′
i is the true label of x
′
i). Error ED takes into account both
clean samples that are misclassified and correctly classified rejected clean samples:
ED =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
I[r(xi) 6= yi] + I[r(xi) = cK+1 ∧ argmax
cj∈C
hj(xi) = yi]
)
. (2)
Error EA considers misclassified adversarial instances that are not rejected:
EA =
1
N ′
N ′∑
i=1
I[r(x′i) 6= y′i ∧ r(x′i) 6= cK+1]. (3)
Fig. 5 presents error rates ED (Eq. 2) and EA (Eq. 3) on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets with
clean samples and three types of adversaries. For naive CNN* and the pure ensemble, error rates
of different types of adversaries (EA) decrease monotonically as the threshold increases. How-
ever, the error rates of adversaries by specialists+1 ensemble are not monotonically decreased. As
confidences for most of the misclassified adversaries by specialists+1 ensemble is lower than 0.5, re-
jection of low confidence predictions at this threshold results in a significant reduction of adversaries
error EA in comparison to naive CNN* and the pure ensemble using this threshold. Accordingly, it
can be confirmed that specialists+1 can shift most of the misclassified adversaries to low confidence,
thus they are being rejected.
Some clean samples that can be correctly classified with high confidence by a CNN are rejected by
the specialists+1 ensemble due to their low confidence, thus increasing slightly ED at a threshold
0.5. Note that increasing the threshold to a higher value causes rejection of a vast majority of
adversaries as well as more clean samples. This thus requires a trade-off between keeping rejection
rate of clean test samples low vs rejecting adversaries that would otherwise fool the networks.
Moreover, from the error rates of FGS and DF adversaries (EA) at threshold zero (Fig. 5), it can be
seen that FGS and DF adversaries can severely fool the new models since they are transferable, i.e.
their cross-model generalization property, while adversaries by Szegedy et al. (2013) are less gen-
eralized across different models. So, a remarkable number of Szegedy adversaries can be correctly
and confidently classified by the models that are different from GA-CNN (the adversaries generative
model). Notice that EA of Szegedy adversaries by specialists+1 does not change considerably after
threshold 0.5. Since most of the high confidence predictions for this type of adversaries (shown by
the cyan pick at the high confidence in Fig. 6(e) and Fig. 7(e)) are correctly and confidently classified
by specialists+1 ensemble.
For a better insight, the rejection rate as a function of the threshold on confidence for MNIST and
CIFAR-10 are shown in association with their distributions of confidence in Fig. 6 and 7, respec-
tively. According to these observations, specialists+1 successfully provides significantly lower con-
fidence for most of the adversaries, regardless of their types, than naive CNN* and the pure ensem-
ble. Therefore, its rejection rate curves of adversaries are increasing at lower confidence and reach
to some picks very fast at a threshold of 0.5. However, the rejection rates of adversaries by the
pure ensemble are monotonically increasing by increasing the threshold, and reach to their picks at
a higher threshold, when a mix of both clean and adversaries samples are being rejected. Also, as it
can be seen from Fig. 6(b), 6(d), and 6(f) that rejection rate curves for MNIST correctly classified
clean test samples by these three frameworks are mostly similar.
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(d) EA(%) on MNIST adversaries by Szegedy et al.
(2013)
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(f) EA(%) on CIFAR-10 FGS adversaries
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(g) EA(%) on CIFAR-10 DF adversaries
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Figure 5: Error rates ED on clean test samples, and error rates EA on their corresponding adver-
saries, as a function of threshold (τ ), for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
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(a) Confidence densities for naive CNN*
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(b) Rejection rate as a function of threshold for naive
CNN*
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(c) Confidence densities for pure ensemble
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(d) Rejection rate as a function of threshold for pure
ensemble
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(e) Confidence densities for specialists+1
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(f) Rejection rate as a function of threshold for special-
ists+1
Figure 6: Confidence densities and rejection rates as a function of threshold on confidence for
MNIST clean test samples and their adversaries depicted for different approaches.
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(b) Rejection rate as a function of threshold for naive
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(c) Confidence densities for pure ensemble
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(d) Rejection rate as a function of threshold for pure
ensemble
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(e) Confidence densities for specialists+1
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(f) Rejection rate as a function of threshold for special-
ists+1
Figure 7: Confidence densities and rejection rates as a function of threshold on confidence for
CIFAR-10 clean test samples and their adversaries depicted for different approaches.
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